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Abstract
The Li-Du-Massar quantum duopoly model is one of the generally accepted quantum game schemes.
It has applications in a wide range of duopoly problems. Our purpose is to study Stackelberg’s duopoly
with incomplete information in the quantum domain. The result of Lo and Kiang has shown that the cor-
relation of players’ quantities caused by the quantum entanglement enhances the first-mover advantage
in the game. Our work demonstrates that there is no first-mover advantage if the players’ actions are
maximally correlated. Furthermore, we proved that the second mover gains a higher equilibrium payoff
that the first one.
1 Introduction
Game theory, launched in 1928 by John von Neumann in [1] and developed in 1944 by John von Neumann
and Oskar Morgenstern in a book [2] is one of the youngest branches of mathematics. The aim of this
theory is to model mathematically the behavior of rational participants who aim at maximizing their own
gain and take into account all possible ways of behaving of remaining participants.
The field developed on the border of game theory and quantum information theory is quantum game
theory. This is an interdisciplinary area of research within which considered games are assumed to be
played with the use of objects that behave according to the laws of quantum mechanics.
The first attempt to describe the game in the quantum domain applied to a simple coin tossing game [3]
and 2× 2 bimatrix games [4], [5]. Shortly after that quantum game theory has found applications in various
fields including decision sciences [6], [7], [8], financial theory [9], [10], [11] or mathematical psychology
[7].
A lot of attention has been focused on the duopoly problems. One of the generally accepted quantum
duopoly scheme is due to Li et al. [13]. A rich literature applies the Li-Du-Massar scheme to the Cournot
dupoly problems [14], [15], [16], [17], the Stackelberg duopoly [23], [18], [19], [20] and the Bertrand
duopoly examples [21], [22], [27]
The existing results motivate further study rather than exhaust the subject. Our previous work [17] shows
that the quantum Cournot duopoly given by a piecewise function requires a best reply analysis to determine
Nash equilibria of the game. This method found further application in the quantum Bertrand duopoly (with
discontinuous payoff functions) [27]. Another problem worth restudying is the Stackelberg duopoly. The
Li-Du-Massar approach to this sequential type of duopoly was first investigated in [23]. The paper provides
a comprehensive analysis for the entanglement parameter γ bounded by γ0 = (1/2) sinh
−1(1). We learned
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from [23] that the first-mover advantage is enhanced when γ > 0, and the difference between the equilibrium
payoffs of player 1 and 2 grows monotonically with γ, having the maximum value at γ = γ0. Surprisingly,
we showed that the first-mover advantage is suppressed as the entanglement parameter γ goes to infinity,
while the second player’s equilibrium payoff increases, and converges to the first player’s equilibrium payoff
[29].
The aim of this paper is to examine the quantum Stackelberg duopoly with incomplete information.
Our work is a reexamination of the problem first formulated in [12]. We show that the previous result only
partially answers the question what optimal strategies and the corresponding payoff results are in both the
classical and quantum game. The equilibrium outcome found in [12] turns out to be well defined only for
initial values of γ. As a result, it is still an open question what the equilibrium result is, for example, in the
most interesting case γ → ∞.
We are interested in finding subgame perfect equilibria of the game and the related equilibrium out-
comes. It needs a more sophisticated reasoning compared with [12]. Our method is based on applying best
reply analysis depending on different choices of the players.
2 Brief review of quantum Stackelberg duopoly with incomplete in-
formation
The problem of quantum approach to Stackelberg’s duopoly with incomplete information was first inves-
tigated in [12]. The authors used the Li-Du-Massar scheme [13] to study Stackelberg’s duopoly with an
additional assumption that a player who moves first (player A) is uncertain about the marginal cost of the
other player (player B). To be specific, player A moves first and offers quantity xA of a homogeneous prod-
uct. Player B observes the move and then offers the quantity xB of the product. In a game of incomplete
information players may be uninformed about certain characteristics of the game. In the case studied in
[12], player A has incomplete information about player B’s marginal cost cB. Player A only knows that
cB = cBH occurs with probability θ and cB = cBL occurs with probability 1 − θ. In contrast, player B knows
her own marginal cost and that of player A. It was assumed in [12] that player A’s payoff function is
uA(xA, xB) = xA(k − xA − xB), (1)
and depending on player B’s marginal cost, her payoff function is
uBL(xA, xB) = xB(kL − xA − xB) or uBH(xA, xB) = xB(kH − xA − xB), (2)
where kL = a−cBL, kH = a−cBH, k = θkH+(1−θ)kL, kH > kL > 0, and a is the price a consumer is willing to
pay for the product if there are no products on the market. It was shown that the Nash equilibrium outcome
(x∗
A
, x∗
BH
, x∗
BL
) is given by
x∗A =
1
2
k, x∗BH =
1
2
(
kH −
k
2
)
, x∗BL =
1
2
(
kL −
k
2
)
(3)
with the payoff outcomes
uA(x
∗
A, x
∗
BH, x
∗
BL) =
1
8
k2, uBH(x
∗
A, x
∗
BH) =
1
4
(
kH −
k
2
)2
, uBL(x
∗
A, x
∗
BL) =
1
4
(
kL −
k
2
)2
. (4)
Solution (3) is valid on condition that
kL ≥
k
2
⇔ θ 6 kL
kH − kL
. (5)
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The quantum extension of (1) and (2) was obtained by replacing xA and xB with xA cosh γ + xB sinhγ and
xB cosh γ + xA sinh γ, respectively. The resulting Nash equilibrium outcome was found to be
x∗A =
cosh2 γ exp(−γ)
1 + cosh γ exp(−γ)k, (6)
x∗BL =
1
2
exp(−γ)
(
kL −
cosh γ exp γ
1 + cosh γ exp(−γ)k
)
, (7)
x∗BH =
1
2
exp(−γ)
(
kH −
cosh γ exp γ
1 + cosh γ exp(−γ)k
)
, (8)
providing that
kL ≥
1 + exp(−2γ)
3 + exp(−2γ)k. (9)
It was claimed in [12] that player A gains advantage over player B in the quantum game, and the first-mover
advantage is being enhanced as the entanglement parameter γ goes to infinity.
3 Comment on the existing result
Studying possible Nash equilibria is a challenging task in a duopoly example with incomplete information.
Applying differential calculus in the case of Stackelberg’s duopoly requires imposing conditions under
which determined Nash equilibria are valid. The assumption (5) already concerning the Nash equilibrium
outcome in the classical game (1)-(2) turns out to be highly restrictive. It increases player A’s incomplete
information about the marginal costs as it puts some restrictions on the probability distribution (θ, 1− θ). In
particular, when the distance between kH and kL is sufficiently large, we see from (5) that the probability θ
of player B’s marginal cost cBH is close to zero, and the game becomes approximately a game with complete
information.
Another issue concerns restrictions imposed on the parameters kL, kH and θ in the quantum game. The
constraint (9) was supposed to guarantee non-negative values of (7) and consequently (8). But (9) should
read
kL −
cosh γ exp γ
1 + cosh γ exp(−γ)k ≥ 0 ⇔ kL ≥
1 + exp 2γ
3 + exp(−2γ)k, (10)
which considerably affects the existing study. Since k > kL, inequality (10) makes sense if (1+ exp 2γ)/(3+
exp(−2γ)) < 1. This implies that the entanglement parameter γ has to satisfy γ ≤ (1/2) ln(1 +
√
2) ≈
0.440687. The equilibrium outcome (6)-(8) is not well defined for γ > (1/2) ln(1 +
√
2). This is in
agreement with the previous work [23], where it was shown that the equilibrium outcome obtained by
applying differential calculus is restricted by the same condition for γ. As a result, all the findings of [12]
for γ > (1/2) ln(1 +
√
2) are not valid. It is still an open question, how the quantum entanglement affects
the players’ strategic positions in the quantum Stackelberg duopoly with incomplete information for larger
values of γ, especially in the most interesting case when γ →∞.
4 Classical Stackelberg duopoly with incomplete information
Stackelberg’s duopoly is derived from Cournot’s duopoly. Both games have the same range of players’
actions and the payoff functions. The only difference is that two players move simultaneously in the
Cournot model whereas they choose sequentially one after the other in the Stackelberg model. Regarding
the method of finding equilibrium strategies, differential calculus is a sufficient tool to determine players’
optimal choices in both types of duopoly problems. It is also useful to find Bayesian equilibrium in the
3
Cournot duopoly with incomplete information (see, for example, [24]). However, as it was shown in [12],
that method fails to determine Bayesian equilibrium in the Stackelberg model with incomplete information
for the full range of θ.
In what follows, we work out a best response analysis to find Bayesian equilibria in the classical game.
4.1 Formal definition of the game
Let us first recall the formal description of Stackelberg’s duopolywith incomplete information. It is assumed
that the marginal cost of player B is either cBH, or cBL, and cBH , cBL. The cost cA of player A is commonly
known. The cost for player B is considered as a random variable to player A. Player A only knows that it
is cBH with probability θ or cBL with probability 1 − θ. Player B knows her own marginal cost. The payoff
functions of the players are
uA(xA, xBH, xBL) = θuA(xA, xBH) + (1 − θ)uA(xA, xBL), (11)
uB(xA, xBH, xBL) = θuBH(xA, xBH) + (1 − θ)uBL(xA, xBL), (12)
where
uA(xA, xB·) =

xA(a − cA − xA − xB·) if xA + xB· < a,
−cAxA if xA + xB· ≥ a,
(13)
uB·(xA, xB·) =

xB·(a − cB· − xA − xB·) if xA + xB· < a,
−cB·xB· if xA + xB· ≥ a,
(14)
and B· is either BH or BL. The payoff functions (13) and (14) are commonly used forms to define problems
of duopoly (see, for example, [24] [25]). The expression a − xA − xB· is defined as the price of the product.
The higher the total quantity xA+ xB· is, the lower the price of the product. Piecewise-defined functions (13)
and (14) take into account the fact that the price cannot be a negative value.
4.2 Subgame perfect equilibrium
Before we proceed to find players’ optimal strategies, we need to select a proper solution concept. In what
follows, we justify applying subgame perfect equilibrium. Initially, the definition of the game suggests
using the concept of Bayesian equilibrium. It follows from the fact that the Stackelberg duopoly with (11)
and (12) can be written in terms of games with incomplete information. In this terminology, player B has
two types, cBH and cBL. Bayesian equilibrium is, in fact, equivalent to a standard Nash equilibrium provided
that each type of a player occurs with a positive probability [26]. Since the Stackelberg duopoly has an
extensive structure, Nash equilibrium may result in many strategy profiles, and some of them may exhibit
non-optimal behavior off the equilibrium path.
A basic Nash equilibrium refinement that is aimed at excluding non-credible strategies is a subgame
perfect equilibrium. It becomes particularly significant when a game has a large number of subgames as
it imposes additional conditions beyond the conditions defining the Nash equilibrium. In contrast, when
the only subgame is a game itself, a subgame perfect equilibrium is equivalent to a Nash equilibrium,
and perfect Bayesian equilibrium may turn out to be a better choice. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a
counterpart of subgame perfect equilibrium in games with incomplete information. Therefore, it is a suitable
Nash equilibrium refinement in the duopoly problem given by (11) and (12). Interestingly, the Stackelberg
duopoly problem with incomplete information can be easily converted into a game with perfect information
(with a chance move) as it was shown in Fig. 1. Since player A has no information about an action chosen
by the chance mover, it makes no difference to player A whether she chooses her action xA before or after
the chance move cL or cH. It follows that perfect Bayesian equilibrium does not refine perfect subgame
equilibrium in the Stackelberg duopoly problem with incomplete information.
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Figure 1: Equivalent extensive forms of the Stackelberg duopoly with incomplete information. The exten-
sive form on the right describes a game with perfect information as all information sets in the game consist
of a single vertex.
Similarly to [12], let kH = a− cH, kL = a− cL and k = θkH + (1− θ)kL for θ ∈ (0, 1) in (13) and (14), and
assume that kH > kL > 0. To find a subgame perfect equilibrium, we begin with subgames starting from
player B’s decision nodes. Consider the subgame determined by the chance action cBL. Given xA ≤ kL,
player B’s best reply is the solution of the equation ∂uBL(xA, xBL)/∂xBL = 0 for xA + xBL < a, which is
x∗BL = (kL − xA)/2. If xA > kL, the derivative of uBL(xA, xBL) with respect to xBL is negative. Hence x∗BL = 0
in that case. We apply the same argument again with xBL replaced by xBH, and obtain
x∗BL =

1
2
(kL − xA) if xA ≤ kL,
0 if xA > kL,
x∗BH =

1
2
(kH − xA) if xA ≤ kH,
0 if xA > kH.
(15)
Given best reply functions (15) of player B, the optimal choice of player A is obtained by maximizing the
function xA 7→ uA(xA, x∗BH, x∗BL). By taking into account (15), the expression uA(xA, x∗BH, x∗BL) can be written
as
uA(xA, x
∗
BH, x
∗
BL) =

uA
(
xA,
1
2
(kH − xA), 12 (kL − xA)
)
if xA ≤ kL,
uA
(
xA,
1
2
(kH − xA), 0
)
if kL < xA ≤ kH,
uA (xA, 0, 0) if kH < xA ≤ a,
=

1
2
(k − xA)xA if xA ≤ kL,
1
2
xA(2k − θkH + (θ − 2)xA) if kL < xA ≤ kH,
xA(k − xA) if kH < xA ≤ a.
(16)
Having found uA(xA, x
∗
BH, x
∗
BL), we are now in a position to determine player A’s best reply to (x
∗
BH, x
∗
BL).
The result is presented by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Player A’s best reply to (x∗BH, x
∗
BL) given by (15) is
x∗A =

2kL(1−θ)+θkH
2(2−θ) if kL <
θkH
2
kL if
θkH
2
≤ kL ≤ θkH1+θ
1
2
k if kL >
θkH
1+θ
,
(17)
5
Proof We first note that xA ≥ kH is not optimal. Player A can obtain a positive payoff by playing xA ≤ kL
whereas xA ≥ kH always results in a negative payoff. Let us find global maximum points of the first two
sub-functions of (16). Write
g(x) =
1
2
(k − x)x, h(x) = 1
2
x(2k − θkH + (θ − 2)x). (18)
An easy computation shows that
argmax
x∈[0,kL]
g(x) =

1
2
k if kL >
θkH
1+θ
kL if kL ≤ θkH1+θ
, argmax
x∈[kL ,kH ]
h(x) =

2kL(1−θ)+θkH
2(2−θ) if kL <
θkH
2
kL if kL ≥ θkH2 .
(19)
and g(kL) = h(kL). Consider the case kL > θkH/(1 + θ). Then kL > θkH/2, and it follows from (19) that
max
x∈[0,kL]
g(x) = g
(
1
2
k
)
> g(kL) = h(kL) = max
x∈[kL ,kH ]
h(x). (20)
We thus proved that x∗
A
= k/2 maximizes (16) if kL > θkH/(1 + θ).
Let us now examine the interval θkH/2 ≤ kL ≤ θkH/(1 + θ). Again, by (19) we conclude that
max
x∈[0,kL]
g(x) = g(kL) = h(kL) = max
x∈[kL ,kH]
h(x). (21)
Therefore x∗
A
= kL in that case. In the same manner we can see that x
∗
A
= (2kL(1 − θ) + θkH)/(2(2 − θ)) if
kL < θkH/2. 
Given best reply (17) to x∗
BH
and x∗
BL
we derive subgame perfect equilibrium outcome.
If kL > θkH/(1 + θ), which is equivalent to k/2 < kL, then by (15) and (17)
x∗A =
1
2
k, x∗BH =
1
2
(
kH −
1
2
k
)
, x∗BL =
1
2
(
kL −
1
2
k
)
. (22)
Similarly, if θkH/2 ≤ kL ≤ θkH/(1 + θ), then
x∗A = kL, x
∗
BH =
1
2
(kH − kL) , x∗BL = 0. (23)
For kL < θkH/2 we have
x∗A =
2(1 − θ)kL + θkH
2(2 − θ) <
θ(1 − θ)kH + θkH
2(2 − θ) =
θkH
2
< kH. (24)
Likewise, we can see that x∗A > kL. Therefore,
x∗BH =
1
2
(
kH −
2(1 − θ)kL + θkH
2(2 − θ)
)
, x∗BL = 0. (25)
To summarize,
(x∗A, x
∗
BH, x
∗
BL) =

(
1
2
k, 1
2
(
kH − 12k
)
, 1
2
(
kL − 12k
))
if kL >
θkH
1+θ
,(
kL,
1
2
(kH − kL), 0
)
if θkH
2
≤ kL ≤ θkH1+θ ,(
2(1−θ)kL+θkH
2(2−θ) ,
1
2
(
kH − 2(1−θ)kL+θkH2(2−θ)
)
, 0
)
if kL <
θkH
2
.
(26)
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Formula (26) leads to the following equilibrium payoff outcomes
uA(x
∗
A, x
∗
BH, x
∗
BL) =

1
8
k2 if kL >
θkH
1+θ
,
1
2
θ(kH − kL)kL if θkH2 ≤ kL ≤ θkH1+θ ,
(−2kL(−1+θ)+θkH )2
8(2−θ) if kL <
θkH
2
.
(27)
uBH(x
∗
A, x
∗
BH) =

1
16
(k − 2kH)2 if kL > θkH1+θ ,
1
4
(kH − kL)2 if θkH2 ≤ kL ≤ θkH1+θ ,
(k+kL+2kH (−2+θ)−θkL)2
16(−2+θ)2 if kL <
θkH
2
.
(28)
uBL(x
∗
A, x
∗
BL) =

1
16
(k − 2kL)2 if kL > θkH1+θ
0 if kL ≤ θkH1+θ .
(29)
Hence,
uB(x
∗
A, x
∗
BH, x
∗
BL) = θuBH(x
∗
A, x
∗
BH) + (1 − θ)uBL(x∗A, x∗BL)
=

1
16
(
(k − 2kL)2(1 − θ) + (k − 2kH)2θ
)
if kL >
θkH
1+θ
,
1
4
(kH − kL)2θ if θkH2 ≤ kL ≤ θkH1+θ ,
(k+kL+2kH (−2+θ)−θkL)2θ
16(−2+θ)2 if kL <
θkH
2
.
(30)
We thus obtained a general solution based on subgame perfect equilibrium concept, which is not restricted
by any specific relations between kL and kH. We see at once the subfunctions of (26)-(30) defined for
kL > kH/(1 + θ) coincide with (3) and (4). Moreover, in contrast to what was stated in [12], a solution is
also found for kL < k/2, or equivalently for kL < θkH/(1 + θ).
It was shown in [12] that whether player A or player B has a better strategic position depends on values
of kH, kL and θ. This is also true in the general case. For example, let kH, kL and θ such that
θkH
2
< kL <
θkH
1 + θ
. (31)
Then, the inequality uA(x
∗
A, x
∗
BH, x
∗
BL) − uB(x∗A, x∗BH, x∗BL) is equivalent to kL > kH/3. It follows that θ = 2/3
implies the first-mover advantage for (31), whereas for θ = 1/2, it is the second player that obtains a higher
equilibrium payoff.
As we will see in Section 5.2 the maximally correlated quantities of the players in the quantum game
lead to a much more transparent equilibrium outcome.
5 Li-Du-Massar approach to Stackelberg’s duopoly with incomplete
information
5.1 Li-Du-Massar approach to duopoly problems
For the convenience of the reader we repeat the relevant material from [13], [27], [28] and [29] in order to
make our exposition self-contained.
Let |00〉 be the initial state and J(γ) = e−γ(a†Aa†B−aAaB) be a unitary operator, where γ ≥ 0 and a†
i
(ai)
represents the creation (annihilation) operator of electromagnetic field i. The player i’s strategies are unitary
operators of the form
Di(xi) = e
xi(a
†
i
−ai)/
√
2, xi ∈ [0,∞), i = A, B. (32)
7
The operator J(γ) and the strategy profile DA(xA) ⊗ DB(xB) determine the final state |Ψf〉,
|Ψf〉 = J†(γ)(DA(xA) ⊗ DB(xB))J(γ)|00〉. (33)
The quantity qi is then obtained by performing the measurement Xi =
(
a
†
i
+ ai
)
/
√
2 on the state |Ψf〉. The
result is
qA = 〈Ψf |XA|Ψf〉 = xA cosh γ + xB sinhγ,
qB = 〈Ψf |XB|Ψf〉 = xB cosh γ + xA sinhγ.
(34)
We obtain the quantum extension of the classical Stackelberg duopoly by substituting (34) into (13) and
(14),
uA(B·)(xA, xB·, γ) =

qA(B·)(a − cA(B·) − eγ(xA + xB·)) if eγ(xA + xB·) ≤ a,
−cA(B·)qA(B·) if eγ(xA + xB·) > a.
(35)
It is worth pointing out that the resulting outputs (34) are not in units of xi’s. Given xA and xB fixed, we see
at once that qi increases with γ, for i = A, B. We can normalize (34) by setting
xi 7→ D
(
xi
eγ
)
. (36)
It follows easily from (36) that the resulting quantities become
q′A =
xA cosh γ + xB sinh γ
eγ
, q′B =
xB cosh γ + xA sinh γ
eγ
, (37)
Both (34) and (37) are equivalent when studying duopoly examples by the Li-Du-Massar scheme. For
example, applying (37) in the Cournot duopoly [28] results in the unique Nash equilibrium (xA, xB) such
that
x∗A = x
∗
B =
a − c
3 + tanh γ
. (38)
In the case of applying (34) the Nash equilibrium strategy is of the form
x∗i =
(a − c) cosh γ
1 + 2e2γ
, (39)
which is simply the division of (38) by eγ. It is worth pointing out that using (37) enables us to compare
classical and quantum equilibria without referring to payoff outcomes. Quantity (38) ranges from the clas-
sical equilibrium strategy (a− c)/3 to the part of the Pareto-optimal profile (a− c)/4. Another advantage of
applying (37) is that we see how xA and xB are correlated when γ → ∞,
lim
γ→∞
q′i =
xA + xB
2
. (40)
Equality (40) will be particularly useful in the next section.
5.2 Subgame perfect equilibria in maximally entangled game
We proceed with the study of the Stackelberg duopoly with incomplete information in the quantum domain.
The work [12] provides us with the equilibrium outcome for γ ≤ γ0 = (1/2) ln(1 +
√
2). Our initial
investigation showed that the results for γ slightly higher than γ0 are moderately interesting. The resulting
equilibrium payoffs are very complex, and the players’ strategic positions depend on the values of kH, kL
and θ. For this reason, we focus on the case in which γ →∞.
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The common method to find a Nash equilibrium (or its refinement) in the Li-Du-Massar approach to a
duopoly problem with maximally correlated quantities of the players is determining the equilibrium profile
for a general value of γ, and then taking the limit as γ goes to infinity. In fact, we can simplify the analysis
by substituting (40) into (13) and (14). In this way we obtain players’ payoff functions in the maximally
correlated case.
uA(xA, xB·) =

xA+xB·
2
(k − xA − xB·) if xA + xB· ≤ a
−c(xA+xB)
2
if xA + xB· > a,
(41)
where B· is either BH or BL, and
uBH(xA, xBH) =

xA+xBH
2
(kH − xA − xBH) if xA + xBH ≤ a
−cH (xA+xBH )
2
if xA + xBH > a,
(42)
uBL(xA, xBL) =

xA+xBL
2
(kL − xA − xBL) if xA + xBL ≤ a
−cL(xA+xBL)
2
if xA + xBL > a,
(43)
Now, we are left with the task of determining players’ rational choices with respect to (41)-(43). The
method for finding subgame perfect equilibria is similar to that used in Subsection 4.2. We first find player
B’s best reply to a strategy xA of player A. For xA + xBH ≤ a we have
∂uBH
∂xBH
=
1
2
kH − xA − xBH,
∂2uBH
∂x2
BH
= −1. (44)
It follows that x∗BH = kH/2 − xA if xA ≤ kH/2. For xA > kH/2, we have ∂uBH/∂xBH < 0. Therefore, uBH has
the highest value at xBH = 0. The same reasoning applies to x
∗
BL. We thus get
x∗BH =

1
2
kH − xA if xA ≤ 12kH,
0 if xA >
1
2
kH,
x∗BL =

1
2
kL − xA if xA ≤ 12kL,
0 if xA >
1
2
kL.
(45)
We are now in a position to determine player A’s best reply x∗
A
to (x∗
BH
, x∗
BL
). By substituting (45) into (11)
we can write uA(xA, x
∗
BH, x
∗
BL) as
uA(xA, x
∗
BH, x
∗
BL) =

uA
(
xA,
1
2
kH − xA, 12kL − xA
)
if xA ≤ 12kL,
uA(xA,
1
2
kH − xA, 0) if 12kL < xA ≤ 12kH,
uA(xA, 0, 0) if
1
2
kH < xA ≤ a.
(46)
=

k2−(2k2−2kkH+k2H )θ
8(1−θ) if xA ≤ 12kL,
1
8
((2k − kH)θkH + 4k(1 − θ)xA − 4(1 − θ)x2A) if 12kL < xA ≤ 12kH,
xA
2
(k − xA) if 12kH < xA ≤ a.
(47)
It enables us to formulate
Proposition 2 A subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in game defined by (41)-(43) is
(
x∗A, x
∗
BH, x
∗
BL
)
=
(
k
2
,
1
2
(kH − k), 0
)
. (48)
Proof Let
g(x) =
1
8
((2k − kH)θkH + 4k(1 − θ)xA − 4(1 − θ)x2A), h(x) =
x
2
(k − x). (49)
Then
dg
dx
= 0 ⇔ x = k
2
and
d2g
dx2
< 0. (50)
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Figure 2: The difference of players’ equilibrium payoffs for θ ∈ [0, 1].
It follows that argmaxkL/2<x≤kH /2 g(x) = k/2. Furthermore, it is easy to check that argmaxkH/2<x<a h(x) =
kH/2. Since
g
(
k
2
)
=
1
8
(
k2 − (k − kH)2θ
)
>
1
8
kH(2k − kH) = h
(
kH
2
)
(51)
and
g
(
k
2
)
>
k2 − (2k2 − 2kkH + k2H)θ
8(1 − θ) (52)
for every θ ∈ (0, 1), we conclude that
argmax
0≤xA≤a
uA(xA, x
∗
BH, x
∗
BL) =
k
2
. (53)
Now substituting x∗
A
= k/2 into (45) completes the proof. 
Let us determine the payoff outcome corresponding to (48). According to (11) and (41), we obtain
uA
(
x∗A, x
∗
BH, x
∗
BL
)
=
1
8
(
k2 − (k − kH)2θ
)
. (54)
From (42) and (43) we see that
uBH(x
∗
A, x
∗
BH) =
1
8
k2H, uBL(x
∗
A, x
∗
BL) =
1
8
(
k2L − (kH − kL)2θ2
)
. (55)
Now (12) becomes
θuBH(x
∗
A, x
∗
BH) + (1 − θ)uBL(x∗A, x∗BL) =
1
8
(
k2 + (k − kH)2θ
)
. (56)
From what has already been obtained, it may be concluded that player B gains advantage in the game with
incomplete information. The difference between player B and player A’s equilibrium payoffs is positive for
every θ ∈ (0, 1) (see, Fig. 2),
(uB − uA)(x∗A, x∗BH, x∗BL) =
1
4
(kH − kL)2 (1 − θ)2θ. (57)
The results (54) and (56) generalize those of [29]. If θ ∈ {0, 1}, player A has complete information about
player B’s marginal cost. In that case both (54) and (56) equal k2/8, which is the equilibrium payoff in the
quantum Stackelberg duopoly (with complete information) [29].
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6 Conclusions
Li-Du-Massar scheme [13] has made a significant contribution to quantum game theory. It has shed some
new light on duopoly problems in the quantum domain. Although, it was originally designed for static
duopoly examples, it has also found application in sequential types of duopoly. The Stackelberg duopoly is
a common example of sequential duopoly models. It is characterized by non-symmetric strategic positions
of the players. The problem becomes even more complex if one of the players does not have complete
information about some aspects of the game. We reexamined the previous study [12] in which the player
who moves first has incomplete information about the marginal cost of the second player. The previous
result was restricted to specific values of kH, kL and θ in both the classical and quantum cases. Moreover,
the existing study of equilibrium outcomes turned out to be valid for initial values of the entanglement
parameter.
Our work has provided the subgame perfect equilibrium analysis of the classical and the quantum game
without any restrictions on the marginal costs. We showed that each player may gain a strategic advantage in
the classical Stackelberg duopoly with incomplete information depending on player B’s marginal costs and
player A’s level of certainty of those marginal costs. Interestingly, our study on the equilibrium outcomes
in the quantum game shows a definitive second-mover advantage. We proved that it holds provided that
the first player assigns a positive probability to both cH and cL, and the players’ quantities are maximally
correlated.
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